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If ontology concerns theories of being, and epistemology theories of knowing, how 
might we bring the two together to account for movements between being and 
knowing that constitute cultural production?  Something occurs or lies behind 
language and meaning that must be acknowledged if we are to arrive at an 
explanation. In this paper, I will examine some key ideas that emerge from the work 
of Julia Kristeva to demonstrate how ontology and epistemology are inextricably 
entwined in knowledge production.  Kristeva’s account of creative practice not only 
aligns with the new materialist acknowledgement of the agency of matter, but through 
her explication of experience-in-practice, it also affirms the dimension of 
human/subjective agency that is implicated in cultural production.   
 
My account here will involve moving between Kristevan thought, Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari’s reflections on the question, “What is philosophy?” and later, to  an 
account of Australian indigenous ontology and art by Brian Martin. In weaving 
together some of the conceptual threads afforded by these domains of thought, I hope 
to illuminate the relationship between being and knowing as living process.  
 
In What is Philosophy?  Deleuze and Gauattari put forward a materialist a conception 
of knowledge production, which they describe as “the art of forming, inventing and 
fabricating concepts” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994:2).  However, whilst they do 
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acknowledge the implication of the human subject through their notion of conceptual 
personae, they do not fully elucidate the crucial relationship between biology, matter 
and language that gives rise to semiosis as an ineluctable foundation of onto-
epistemology. Kristevan thought, provides a model for understanding how material-
discursive practices emerge from corporeal responses and are translated into language 
and thought.  In experience-in-practice there is a constant movement between the 
material world, the biological/material self (the self as “other”) and the social self. 
This movement gives rise to a performative production of knowledge or onto- 
epistemology.  
 
 “Permeability” is a useful  term for unravelling Kristeva’s account  of the complex 
relationship between body and mind and individual and society as a dynamic process 
of how we come to make meaning.  It allows us to understand that humans are 
continuous with nature and other objects in the world. Biological processes that 
support and enable human life operate as a semiotic “filter” and this filtering 
attributes value to objects encountered via sensation and affect. Kristeva demonstrates 
that human consciousness and language are products of these “filtering” processes. 
 
A crucial distinction between Kristeva and Deleuze and Guattari’s accounts can be 
found in their differing conceptions of “affect” and the emphasis that Kristeva places 
on the link between affect and language. Affect is hardwired into the human 
biological system as an instinctual mechanism for warding off  - impelling the 
organism away from - what is sensed as dangerous and harmful and for registering 
pleasurable sensations.  In departing from Freud, Kristeva suggests that both negative 
and positive affect have the power to impel; they can therefore be understood as a 
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form of agency. It is in the phase where pleasure or un-pleasure is registered that 
objects begin to take on value or become perceptions as opposed to what Deleuze and 
Guattari call “percepts” or  sensations that are “independent of a state of those who 
experience them” Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 164) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceive affects as non- human becomings or blocs of 
sensation that occur when material passes into sensation. They explain that this takes 
place within a zone or phase of indetermination and indiscernibility that precedes 
immediately before natural differentiation. In this framework affects are non-human 
compounds of sensation that occur when humans become continuous with the 
material world.  When sensation becomes sensation of a concept, the composite 
sensation is reterritorialized. (1994:199).  Deleuze and Guattari’s explication of these 
human/non-human transformations is ambiguous and couched in abstractions that do 
not fully explain the movement from the material process (blocs of undifferentiated 
sensation as being) to the subject of language and thought.  Kristeva’s notion of 
heterogeneity on the other hand, precludes the conception of pure or undifferentiated 
sensation of (human) beings. Central to understanding  this and how being and 
language co-emerge is what Kristeva has theorised as the semiotic chora that gives 
rise to the heterogeneity of language:  the “symbolic” -  language as it signifies (the 
communicative function of language) -  and the “semiotic” language as it is related to 
material or biological processes that are closely implicated in affect (Kristeva 1984). 
 
The Semiotic and The Symbolic 
The semiotic chora, the space or site of biological interactions and exchanges 
between the infant and the mother’s body, registers the first imprints of experience 
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that are rudimentary signals of language that is to follow.  It is an articulation of 
bodily drives, energy charges and psychical marks  - a non-expressive totality, known 
through its effects.  This constitutes the heterogeneity that distinguishes human 
biology and psychic life from the outset. It is also related the dynamism of the body 
constantly in motion and perpetually seeking to maximise the capacities of the living 
organism. It is a complex of pulsations - intensities tensions and release of tensions 
that occur through interactions with what lies beyond or outside the living system.   
 
Kriteva tells us that operations of the chora, organise pre-verbal psychic space 
according to logical categories that precede and transcend language.  These operations 
or semiotic functions, which are constituted through biological drives and energy 
discharges, initially oriented around the mother’s body, persist as an asymbolic 
modality that governs the connections between the body and the “other” throughout 
the life of the subject. They articulate a continuum between the body and external 
objects and between the body and language  (Kristeva 1984: 27). We may now 
understand the “semiotic” as an alternative material  “code” of language, a “bodily 
knowing” that nonetheless implicates itself in relays of meaning that are manifested in 
social relations.   
 
In creative production, the drives or impulses that are articulated by the semiotic 
operate through and in language and result in variations and multiplicity of meanings 
that may be produced.  The semiotic disposition of language, which corresponds to 
what Deleuze and Guattari describe as harmonies rhythms or style, establishes a 
relational functioning between the signifying code and the fragmented or drive ridden 
body of the speaking (and hearing/seeing) subject (Kristeva 1986: 29). This putting-
 5
into-process of language must connect with our biological processes, affects and 
feelings in a vital way in order for language to take on particular meanings or to affect 
us. Creative practice or  “the productive performance” of language maintains the link 
between the semiotic and the symbolic, between discourse and our lived and situated 
experiences  - our material being in the world.  Three terms, “negativity”, “rejection” 
and “signifiance” are crucial to understanding Kristeva’s account of language as 
material process. 
 
Negativity and Rejection 
“Negativity” can be understood as the processes of semiotic motility and charges or 
“death drive”, a force that impels movement towards an undifferentiated or archaic 
phase that precedes the subject’s entry into language.  Kristeva draws on Freud to 
explain negativity as a drive or urge, inherent in organic life to return earlier states. 
(Kristeva: 1984:160). Negativity  operates dynamically and dialectically between the 
biological and social order, replacing the fixed categories and oppositions of language 
to produce what Kristeva refers to as an “infinitesimal differentiation within the 
phenotext” (Kristeva 1984: 126).  
 
Negativity is closely related to, and cannot be considered apart from two related 
concepts in Kristeva’s account of language as material process. She posits 
“expenditure “ or “rejection” as better terms for explaining the movement of material 
contradictions that generate the semiotic function. If negativity is a motility or 
dynamism that seeks an undifferentiated state, rejection is what repeatedly interrupts 
this movement.  Rejection moves between the two poles of drives and consciousness.  
Think of negativity and rejection working together as a kind of pre-linguistic pulse 
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that sets up a constant rhythmic responsiveness to language and to other objects in the 
world.   Rejection constitutes the shattering of unity or unified meaning.  It has a 
relation or connection to language, but only in terms of what Kristeva’s refers to as 
scission or separation that opens up a crucible of intensities and sensation where 
meaning is ruptured, superseded and exceeded (Kristeva 1984: 147).  This is an 
indication of the asymbolic functioning of the chora as discussed above. However, 
rejection is ambiguous in that it is also a pre-condition for the emergence of new 
meanings and renewed or recuperated subjectivity. The perpetual rhythms and 
workings of material and biological processes that maintain the living organism: 
negativity–rejection… negativity- rejection…  are continuous with processes that 
produce the subject, language and meaning.  They begin the process of “filtering” that 
transforms stimuli into coherent form. What is important to note at this stage, is that 
in aesthetic experience, both the production and reception of the artwork, inscribes 
negativity and rejection by bringing the symbolic function into an encounter with the 
semiotic or material dimensions of the work. This results in an unsettling and 
multiplying of meaning (Kristeva, 1984:22) and the work is experienced both as 
material object and as a form of representation as  be illustrated with reference to the 
work of Brian Martin. The ongoing renewal and production of the subject or 
subjectivity through material processes underpins the ongoing renewal and production 
of language and meaning, in creative practice as onto-epistemology.     
 
Signifiance  
Kristeva uses the term signifiance to distinguish the supplementary signifying process 
from signification - the conventional way in which words signify meaning.  
Signifiance is an alternative signifying process that is the result of the heterogeneous 
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workings of language which articulates both symbolic and semiotic dispositions: 
language as it is conventionally coded as opposed to material/sensory articulations of 
language - sound, rhythm and prosody in verbal language; colour, line and other 
formal elements in visual language. This double articulation of language allows the  
text or artwork that emerges from experience-in-practice to signify what the 
communicative or representative function of the work cannot say. (Kristeva, 1980: 
18).  Signifiance allows us to grasp how words or verbal and visual utterances can be 
charged with multiple and hitherto unimagined meanings.  If we look at Edvard 
Munch’s (1893) painting The Scream for example, this relationship becomes 
apparent. (slide 2).  The unity of the composition is constantly disrupted by the impact 
of lines creating dynamism and movement and breaking up the compositional space.  
Ambiguity and indeterminacy give rise to multiple meanings – for example it is 
difficult to distinguish landscape from sky or to tell if the two figures in the 
background are approaching or receding, If we keep looking long enough, the retinal 
impact of colour and line operate synesthetically to becomes noise, and the surface of 
the painting induces not meaning, but sensation.   
 
From a brief encounter with Munch’s painting, we can see how the semiotic, as well 
as being a precondition for the symbolic, functions synchronically with the symbolic.  
The marks, swirling lines and brushstrokes in Munch’s painting, both indicate and 
exceed their representational and compositional functions.  Sensation, language and 
thought become concurrent and interchangeable and the boundaries between them are 
permeable. The work captures the artist’s particular lived and embodied experience 
and preserves it in  what Deleuze and Guattari describe as a  “bloc of sensation” of 
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lived experience – the work is not a only representation of the scream it is the scream 
as sensation; these two elements affect the viewer simultaneously. 
 
 In Deleuze and Guattari’s schema such a work would give rise to percepts and affects 
that engender a non-human becoming, where being and the world merge as material 
process.  How can we explain this erasure of the subject and emanation of the work of 
art without falling into mysticism? Kristeva suggests that psychoanalysis provides us 
with a way out of the impasse through its account of the relationship between 
biological processes and thought/language. In a sense, psychoanalysis gestures 
towards notions of a “transcendental” that neither privileges the Cartesian subject nor 
social constructivist accounts of the subject. Kristevan thought, with its insistence on 
heterogeneity does not fully jettison the human or subjective dimension of this 
process because in a Kristevan framework, the subject as sensation, as being is also an 
already constituted (heterogeneous) subject of the symbolic. 
 
It has perhaps become clear from the discussion, so far, that words and images strike 
the body in the same way as objects. Deluze and Guattari acknowledge that 
philosophical concepts are also sensibilia in the same way that aesthetic objects are 
sensibilia (Deleuze and Guattari1994: 5). Aesthetic experience also corresponds with 
what they describe as the moment that material passes into sensation and articulates a 
zone in which we no longer know which is animal and which is human (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 173).  What Kristeva provides however, is an understanding of the 
originary processes that link bodily processes to language. This is fundamental to 
grasping the idea of creative production as material process, and as an alternative 
mode of semiosis.   
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 In Art beyond Representation (2004), Barbara Bolt provides illustration of this in her 
description of experience-in-practice as “working hot”.   In material practices such as 
painting, there is an intensification of contradiction brought about by the 
unpredictable and/or accidental effects produced by the interactions of the materials 
and tools used in the making of the work.  Often, this requires speedy and 
spontaneous responses in which no time or space is left for rational thought.  This 
does not mean as Deleuze and Guattari imply and as Judith Butler has claimed in her 
notion of performativity (1993), that the subject is strictly speaking, absent. The issue 
of the subject’s absence in performativity turns on the relationship between the notion 
of an already constituted subject of language/discourse and the subject of practice – 
the subject as being.   
 
In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva tells us that “The subject never is, the 
subject is only the signifying process and he appears only as a signifying practice” 
(Kristeva, 1984, 215). It is important not to mistake the inflection in Kristeva’s 
statement since it does not imply the total absence of the subject, but a movement 
towards, and appearance of the subject to a more fluid and dynamic process. 
Elsewhere, Kristeva’s references to the absence of the (human) subject relate to 
psychoanalytical accounts (particularly that of Lacan) - of the subject as it is 
positioned or coalesced through the symbolic and the social. In her account of 
creative practice however, Kristeva’s notion of the “speaking subject” goes beyond 
such accounts by positing heterogeneity. This casts a different light on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of  “sensation as being” and on their description of affects as “non-
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human becomings” of man (1994: 169).  The notion of heterogeneity acknowledges 
another register or prevailing presence of “subjectivity” as material process and 
contradiction that constitute different forms of agency.  Kristeva tells us that the 
experience of practice puts the subject in “process/on trial”, a condition in which 
subjective processes are predominantly determined by biological processes and drives 
so that an alternative logic is at work, the logic of material process and of the 
unconscious where there is “no time” in the sense of linear temporality, and where the 
binaries and contradictions of the symbolic and established discourses do not hold.  
The knowledge or reality brought about by direct experience is thus  “a signifying 
apprehension of a new heterogeneous object” (Kristeva 1984:202).   This articulates 
the subject as a filter or passageway where there is a struggle between conflicting 
tendencies or drives whose stases or representamen are rooted in affective processes.  
This point is crucial to understanding why and how Kristeva places the subject and 
forms of subjective agency, rather than mechanistic or automatic processes at the core 
of revolutionary practice. The key is her conception of  “affect” - both positive and 
negative affects that originate in pleasure and displeasure.  
 
Pleasure can be understood as the removal or absence of displeasure. In encounters 
with objects in the world, negativity and rejection give rise to sensation; However, 
following raw sensation is a concurrent emergence or registering of positive or 
negative affects that attribute value(s) or that “colour” encounters with the material 
world and other sensibilia.  This constitutes a movement towards thought and 
symbolic language.  The question of just how this shift occurs still remains.  
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The Psychoanalytical term “cathexis” is pertinent here. Synonymous with 
“investment” cathexis is a drive that implicates subjective motivation or volition 
towards both libidinal and discursive economies. Charles Rycroft describes it as  “a 
quantity of energy attaching to any object or mental structure” (Rycroft 1995:19). 
Hypercathexis involves an intensity of investment in one process or set of 
configurations in order to repress others (Kristeva 1984:14).  Kristeva  explains that 
cathexis is a moment of the coalescing of subjectivity according to the pleasures and 
displeasures of our encounters with objects – something between an emotional 
commitment and a vested interest in the relative rewards and satisfactions offered in 
processes of making and interpreting art and indeed in experiences of everyday life.  
The notion of cathexis permits an understanding of movements between being and 
knowing or the culminating point that Deleue and Guattari call reterritorialization.  
 
Kristeva’s work posits a materialist “transcendental”:  material process as an infinite 
unfolding or  two-way movement between the material world, biological processes 
and discourse. The subject as biological organism or being, is a “filter” through which 
objects pass as raw sensation and are then transubstantiated, if you like, into language.  
In experience-in-practice language becomes the space of an alternative or 
translinguistic representation that allows a transfer from instinctual conflict arising 
from the physiological on one hand, and conscious thought on the other. Situated 
between the body (energy, drive, excitability) and mind (representation), “language 
allows thought to reach and stabilize energy” (Kristeva 2000: 35).  
 
Finally, Kristeva’s focus on subjective processes as forms of agency must also be 
understood in relation to the “agency” of materiality itself. Kristeva’s work 
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acknowledges the agency of  “brute” materiality. In her account there is no opposition 
between inside and outside - consciousness and materiality are mutually constitutive 
and enfolded. This is the basis of onto-epistemological practice and it is in this sense, 
that we can begin to articulate what we mean the notion of a “new materialism.”  
 
Indigenous Ontology 
The notion of  “onto-epistemology” as the basis of all cultural production is 
articulated in Australian artist, Brian Martin’s practice and his account of Australian 
Indigenous ontology Martin tells us that in an Indigenous world view, it is self evident 
that the immaterial and the imaginary, the real and representation occur inter-
changeably and concurrently. Through his art practice and elaboration of what he 
calls  “real immateriality” Martin brings a fresh perspective to understanding of 
movements that occur between the material world, being and knowing. 
The relation ship of culture and “Land” or “Country” is the foundation Indigenous 
ideology and culture.  In a traditional Aboriginal society, movement with and in  
Country defines material existence as ways of being, ways of doing and ways of 
knowing.  This relationship constitutes and is constituted by the interconnection 
connection of memory, life and culture, which are embedded in Country:  
 
Indigenous art practices manifest this trinity. Within this framework, the 
immaterial is materially constituted by the real material conditions of 
existence, where the immaterial itself, becomes a reality. This “immateriality” 
in Indigenous cultural ideology is manifest in the real existence of Country 
and ever continuing cultural practices. (Martin 2013: 17) 
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The interrelatedness of material existence and cultural production challenges 
dominant western discourse and conceptions of art formulated in a representationalist 
view of the world. The ontological relationship that people have to country is vital in 
Indigenous cultural practices where the relationship between the referent and the sign 
is causal and reciprocal. Indigenous ontology and cultural practices are based on a 
methexical relationship, or what Paul Carter describes as a performative action that 
brings something into being and existence. (Carter 1996: 84).  For example when the 
emu dance is performed, the being of sensation of the dancer is emu and the aesthetic 
image produced transfers the sensation of the dancer’s lived experience to the 
audience.  Pertinent here is Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the artwork as 
“monument”. The artwork as monument does not commemorate the past, but is a bloc 
of present sensations Deleuze and Guattari (1994:167).  In this example it engenders a 
becoming emu of both the dancer and the audience. Martin observes that this 
methexical relationship, which entails a collapse between the ontological and the 
representational, emphasizes the physical/material ground of Indigenous practices and 
permits an understanding of how, the “real” and the “immaterial”, the “imaginary” , 
the “spiritual” and the “representational” operate concurrently as “real immateriality”. 
It is this inter-relatedness and its effects that assign value and meaning in Indigenous 
cultural production and worldview.  
 
In Indigenous culture there is also no distinction between art, culture and living or 
being. In Aboriginal language words describing art not nouns, but denote action. The 
artwork enacts the thing so that a painted landscape, a tree of an animal is the thing 
itself. Making and viewing artworks involves a re-experiencing of the thing. 
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As explained in his analysis of the works of Kathleen and Margaret Petyarre,( slide 3) 
and Badger Bates in his essay entitled  “Immaterial land” in Carnal Knowledge: 
Towards a ‘New Materialism through the Arts’ (Barrett and Bolt 2013), the function 
of the repetition of mark-making in Aboriginal art is to engender a performative 
methexical mapping of Country, to bring Country into being. (see slides 4 and 5 
Badger Bates)   We see this again in Rover Thomas’ Landscapes, (1984) where the 
dots become an indexical trace of the jabbing action of painting that maps the ground 
and produces a synesthetic rhythm conveying a sense of movement. This allows the 
maker to re-experience Country and viewer to grasp how both meaning and re-
experiencing emerges from the action of art making (slide 6 Rover Thomas). 
 
In Martin’s drawing practice the interrelationship between figuration and abstraction 
not only enacts this methexical dimension of art making, but also mirrors the 
interrelationship between the material and the immaterial, the imaginary and the real. 
This is achieved through the articulation of the relationship between the abstract and 
the representational. (Slide 7 Darug 1)  In his Methexical Countryscapes the rhythm 
of mark making using charcoal on paper, maps the texture of Country as the artist has 
experienced it. The scale of the works (2 metres x 1.5 metres) heighten their 
immersive quality.   
 
However it is his use of the grid (each work is made up of thirty panels) that 
articulates the relationship between abstraction and figuration and hence the notion of 
the concurrence of representation and the real or material in aesthetic experience: 
Martin explains how the grid reveals the double articulation that is a feature of all 
artworks and of the viewing experience: 
 
It is at the point where the physical and conceptual meet that the viewer can 
see how they are made. It is this aspect of drawing “diffractively” that is 
performative. Drawing “diffractively” is where the image is never fully seen 
as “realism” because it is diffracted by the grid, and therefore moves in and 
out of the position of a representationalist way of looking at the world… 
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Practice enforces us to look from a different positioning, one that moves from 
the abstract to the concrete concurrently.  
(Martin 2013: 84)  show slides 8- 13) 
 
Martin’s work and his use of the grid to reveal the actions and process of art-making 
and well the material qualities of visual language, illuminates the fundamentally 
materialist ontology of Indigenous culture.  His work refuses a representationalist 
mode of thought that has dominated Western discourse since the Enlightenment and 
was reflected in the development of one-point perspective in European art. This 
representational thinking, in which the real the imaginary the material and the 
immaterial are separated, is challenged by the materialist perspectives I have 
attempted to present in this essay. 
 
_________ 
Renaissance Architect Filippo Brunelleshi and artist Albrecht Durer employed the 
grid to establish one-point perspective in order to transfer reality as humans saw it 
onto to the canvas. Their use of the grid evoked an illusion of three-dimensional 
reality by transferring visual elements or contours of objects from one scale to another 
and into two-dimensional form. The drawing then stood in for reality – it was 
representational. Whilst, the viewer couldn’t walk into the deep space of the painting, 
he or she would have an imaginary illusion of depth.  
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